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Pension systems have recently been under scrutiny because of the expected population 
ageing threatening its sustainability. This paper’s contribution to the debate is from a political 
economic perspective as it uses data from a choice experiment to investigate individual 
preferences for an alternative state pension scheme based around preferences for cost, 
poverty, retirement age and pension parameters. Answers are used to estimate a lifecycle 
utility model of preferences towards pensions’ parameters. Results suggest that individuals’ 
value orientation is an important determinant of their preferences. Respondents’ income 
determines which degree of redistribution is preferred. However, preferences according to 
age are in contradiction with what is suggested in theory. 
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1  Introduction 
The implementation of pension systems has been one of the most important achievements 
in terms of social policy in the developed world during the twentieth century. However, 
discussions on the “pension crisis” and the way to reform pension systems have rapidly 
emerged due to demographic and budgetary pressures. Pension reform is nowadays in the 
forefront of the political agenda of many European countries. Still, the reform process is 
slow, despite the urgency required, partially due to political sensitivity. This is partially 
and importantly due to the fact that public pension’s schemes are redistributive.  
The main focus of this paper is to answer the following questions: what are individual 
preferences over redistribution by state pension systems and what determines these 
preferences? Several studies within the political economy theory field have attempted to 
identify the forces that drive the support for income redistribution and the welfare state. 
Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) summarize these hypotheses into three arguments. The first 
is an efficiency argument which posits that individuals are willing to pay to reduce the 
risk associated with their ex ante income distribution because they may be risk averse. 
The second is the self-interest argument which considers that egoistic pecuniary motives 
are a major determinant of individual preferences. The third argument relates to 
inequality aversion. The logic, according to which people would support redistributive 
government policies if they expect to gain from these policies, has been suggested by the 
median voter model (Meltzer and Richard (1981))
2, as well as by the Esping-Andersen 
(1985) as the power resource theory. However, both on the theoretical and empirical 
grounds, the median voter hypothesis has often been questioned (Moene and Wallerstein 
(2003), Kenworthy and McCall (2008)). Indeed, preferences may include the social status 
enjoyed by the individual. Individuals may also be inequality averse. Recently, stated 
preferences techniques have been introduced to analyze preferences for redistribution by 
the state. For instance, Corneo and Grüner (2002) find empirical evidence that three 
effects drive support for redistributive policies: the “homo-oeconomicus” effect, the 
“public values effect” and the “social rivalry effect”. On the contrary, Fong (2001) finds 
little evidence that self interest is an important determinant of demand for redistribution, 
in his study social preferences are more important.  
In the field of distributive preferences for pension programs, it has been shown that social 
security is supported primarily by self–interested desires on the part of an important 
proportion of citizens. Old age public pensions create self-interested beneficiaries that 
might be against the retrenchment of the welfare state (See Pierson, “Dismantling the 
Welfare State” (1994)). Little empirical studies have conducted to confirm or disconfirm 
this hypothesis (apart from Lynch (2006)). However, preferences may also be other-
regarding, referred to as social preferences. For example, means-tested schemes have 
proved to be politically sustainable even if they are concentrated on a small range of 
people. On the empirical side, a strand of the literature has developed recently to analyze 
the preferences and opinion of citizens concerning pensions. See for instance the Special 
Eurobarometer survey on Pension Policy and Pension Reform conducted in 2004. Boeri 
et al. (2001) use stated preferences contingent valuation methods to analyze attitudes 
                                                 
2 Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Iverson (2005) posit that self-interest is a key determinant of attitudes towards 
redistributive social policies. Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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towards possible pension reforms in Germany, Italy, France and Spain. van Groezen et al. 
(2008) analyze the determinants of people’s preferences for particular kinds of pension 
provision (public, occupational and private) in 15 European countries. Delaney et al. 
(2006), examine preferences for specific forms of redistribution in Ireland: 
unemployment payments, old age pensions and child benefit and find support to the self-
interested preferences. See also Ferrara (1993); Lynch (2006); van Els et al. (2003); 
Devroye (2003), Hamil-Luker (2001). In this study we will utilize a preference survey 
undertaken in Ireland to try to answer these questions. 
Old age pensions are central for the Welfare State in Ireland. On the one hand, they fulfil 
various objectives among which redistribution and poverty alleviation. On the other hand, 
public pension expenditures represent a large share of social public expenditures. Over 
the last decade, several reports (especially governmental) and academic research papers 
aiming at presenting an overview of the Irish pension system and possible alternatives as 
regard policy options for reform have been published. Recent examples are the two 
reports prepared under the aegis of the Pensions Board: the “National Pensions Review 
(2005)” and “Special Savings for Retirement (2006)”; and the “Green Paper on Pensions 
(2007)”. Even though these reports have covered a wide range of issues, people’s opinion 
and choices regarding the future of the pension system have rarely been taken into 
consideration.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the 
functioning of the Irish pension system, the challenges that threaten its sustainability and 
the debate around pension reform in Ireland. Section three introduces a life cycle utility 
model for pension preferences. Section four presents the theoretical basis of discrete 
choice experiments. Section five outlines the preparation of the questionnaire and 
presents summary statistics for the sample. In section six, we present results from 
different discrete choice models. Finally, in section seven, we discuss future directions of 
research. 
2  The challenges of population ageing and poverty for the Irish pension system 
2.1  Pension provision in Ireland 
The Irish pension system is in many respects typical of the Anglo-Liberal style of welfare 
state, with a relatively insignificant social insurance system, where means testing and 
progressive income taxes are more important. The state pension system has its origins in 
the UK old age assistance act of 1908, with a social insurance pension being introduced 
for those 70+ in 1961, with a retirement pension at 65 introduced in 1970 (See 
O’Donoghue (2002). The scheme is Beveridgean in focus with more emphasis on poverty 
alleviation than on income replacement. Together, the public and private pension 
schemes operating in Ireland (Figure 1) serve several objectives in different degrees, 
namely, maintenance of individual standard of living during the period of retirement, 




Figure 1  
Pillars of the Irish pension system 
 
2.2  The old age social welfare system 
The public pension system - first pillar, public and mandatory - is funded on a Pay As 
You Go (PAYG) basis has three components a State pension – Contributory - available 
from age 66; a State pension – Transition, available from age 65, but requiring 
retirement; and, a survivor’s pension. All are flat rate payments that vary slightly based 
upon contribution history but independent of earnings, with additional payments for 
dependants. These are supplemented by means-tested benefits, financed through taxation 
for those not covered by the insurance system, resulting from significant historical gaps 
in social insurance coverage. These are nevertheless declining due to the progressive 
extension of coverage since 1974, resulting in the share of pensioners claiming means-
tested payments falling from 45 % in 1994 to 30% in 2004, and expected to reach 14% in 
2017. The current replacement rate for a single pensioner is AAA. 
2.3  The supplementary pension scheme 
The second and third (private and voluntary) pillars are represented by supplementary 
occupational and/or individual pensions: voluntary tax incentivised private or 
occupational system, which main objective is to smooth income over an individual’s 
lifetime. Growth in occupational and private pension schemes only accelerated in earnest 
after the Finance Act 1972 which set up a clear legal and fiscal framework for them, but 
has levelled out in recent years. After a period of increasing coverage of occupational 
pensions, ESRI surveys in 1995 found that 52% of the employed workforce was covered 
by occupational schemes, down from 54.4% 1985, but up from 35.6% in 1974. Recent 
Statistical Office figures in 2008 indicate that the percentage of employees with an 
occupation pension has remained relatively constant fallen to about 52%. The proportion 
of defined contribution schemes has increased from 12% in 1992 (National Pensions 
Board (1993)) to 17% in 1995 (Hughes and Whelan (1996)) to 33% in 2008 (National 
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  State Pension (Contributory) 
  State Pension (Transition) 
Old Age Non-Contributory Pension 
(Means-Tested). 
Public Service Pension Arrangements 
Occupational Pension Arrangements 
Personal Pensions Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
5 
 
Pensions Board (2008)) of which the majority are in the private sector, where about 50% 
of the pension members are members of DC schemes.  
Personal pension arrangements consist essentially of Retirement Annuity Contracts 
(RACs) used by the self-employed and more recently the Personal Retirement Saving 
Accounts (PRSAs) introduced in 2003 to meet the willingness of the government to 
extend the supplementary coverage. The main problem related to supplementary 
arrangements in Ireland concerns the low coverage (around 50 %), especially among self 
employed. Low contribution rates represent a further inefficiency; they are seen to be 
insufficient to guarantee adequate replacement rates after retirement. It is therefore not 
surprising that the government makes a priority of the necessity to increase incentives 
that would make employers, employees, self-employed and others contribute more into 
private pension arrangements (both occupational or private). The government is also 
reviewing its incentives policy to be more effective. 
2.4  Poverty among the elderly 
Pensioners in Ireland are a vulnerable group due to being highly dependent on transfers 
payments and having very low labour force participation. In this respect, the National 
Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) adopted by the government in 1997 to address the problem 
of poverty, and National Action Plan against Poverty and Social Exclusion (NAP/incl), 
identify older people as a particularly vulnerable group to poverty, and both documents 
list a number of targets in relation to income support and service provision for the elderly. 
The average net income for a pensioner unit in 2005 was € 327.55 per week (Green Paper 
(2007)). In 2002, a single pensioner had a replacement rate relative to Gross Average 
Industrial Earnings of 27.2 % if reliant on means tested benefits and 32 % of Gross 
Average Industrial Earnings. While coverage of the insurance scheme is increasing, the 
low replacement rate and lower indexation the level of household earnings growth over 
the boom years saw a rapid rise in elderly poverty; the relative poverty rate of pensioners 
rose from 5.9 % in 1994, to 43.3% in 2000 compared with 16.9% for the working age 
population (DSFA (2002)) and 44.1 % in 2001. Increased indexation of state pensions in 
the past decade has seen a fall in the poverty rate to 14% in 2006, but rose again in 2007 
to 17%.This is high by international standards. In 2005, Ireland had the highest level of 
relative income poverty in the EU among over-65s (OECD (2005)).  
2.5  Population ageing: Key demographic trends 
While less serious than some other EU countries, nevertheless, demographic ageing 
expected to result in increasing the old age dependency ratios, which will put fiscal 
pressures on the public finances. Nevertheless, the demographic situation is relatively 
favourable for the next 20 years (Gerald (2004)), especially compared to the situation in 
the other European countries. Ireland still has a young population, and consequently a 
longer period to prepare for the transition from low to high dependency. In the OECD 
countries for instance, the old age dependency ratio is expected to double by 2050, to 
around 40 percent compared to an average 18 per cent in the 1990s (OECD Social Policy 
Studies (1996)), whereas in Ireland, it will be rising from 15 percent to 36 percent 
(Department of Social and Family Affairs (2006)) 
The increase of the population share of those aged 65 and over represents the main 
pressure on the public services as age-related public expenditures will have to rise. Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Pensions are expected to represent the most important part of these increases. Hence, 
much of the debate relating to the pensions public policy in Ireland centres around the 
impact of demographic and economic change on the public finances (DOF (1998)) and 
the potential cost and funding arrangements. Public spending on first pillar pensions 
(including public service pensions) is projected to rise from 4.6 % in 2000 to roughly 9-
14% of GDP in 2050 (Natali (2004)). Thus the country is faced with both cost and 
adequacy issues in relation to the pensioner population. Consequently, the combination of 
the poverty risk among the elderly with the challenging demographic pressures calls for 
targeted intervention of the State in the field of pensions.  
2.6  Reforming the Irish pension system 
Because of the concerns raised above about the future increase in public pension 
expenditures, the National Pensions Reserve Fund Act 2000 established a national 
pensions fund to help finance both public pensions and public service occupational 
pensions. Each year, at least 1 per cent of GNP will be deposited in the fund between 
2001 and 2055. From 2025 the exchequer will be able to draw down monies from the 
fund to finance expenditures on public pensions and on the occupational pensions of 
public sector workers. 
There have been a number of structure reforms over the 1990’s and 2000’s that has 
resulted in an increase in coverage and since 2001 an increased replacement rate, towards 
a target of 34 % of average earnings set by the National Pensions Policy Initiative 
(NPPI
3). The NPPI also advocated increasing supplementary pension coverage rates with 
a target coverage rate of 70 % and through increasing personal pension accounts through 
setting legislative framework to put in place to provide Personal Retirement Saving 
Accounts (PRSAs); However these reforms have been largely parametric, with policy 
relying on incrementalism to move towards a universal pension scheme in time rather 
than a quick move. There seems to be very little public appetite, as manifested in public 
consultation exercises like the Green paper on pensions in 2007, for major structural 
reforms such as the move to an earnings related state pension or changes in the state 
retirement age. 
The debate has further been developed more recently
4 focusing on improved adequacy, 
the abolition of the retirement requirement at age 65 to allow older people to continue to 
contribute to the economy if they wish to do so, mandatory membership of  PRSAs for all 
workers and a review of the generous tax relief for private pension provision which costs 
a similar amount as the social welfare pension. The Green Paper on Pensions, 2007 
discusses different policy options including the introduction of universal pensions, 
reforming and back-dating the homemaker’s scheme, replacing the average contribution 
test with a total contribution approach and miscellaneous issues relating to social welfare 
pensions including indexing, the existence of two contributory pension schemes, social 
insurance for spouses of farmers/self employed. The Green Paper also considers the 
introduction of a mandatory or soft-mandatory supplementary pension scheme.  
                                                 
3 The NPPI has been launched in order to facilitate national debate on how to achieve a developed national policy system 
and to formulate a strategy and make recommendations for actions needed to achieve the system.  
4 See Submission to the National Pensions Board on the Pensions Review, Combat Poverty Agency, September, 2005. Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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Despite these reports, reforming Ireland’s pension system is still a difficult task. 
However, it can be made easier by understanding citizens’ opinion concerning the size 
and shape of the welfare state and more generally, by tackling the sources of political 
conflict over the potential directions of reform and the different approaches to address 
sustainability. The different alternatives that can be considered range from maintaining 
the status quo to some option reforms. Note that maintaining the status quo would mean 
that, in the short to medium term, about 47,000 people on average would remain outside 
the Social Welfare pensions system (Green Paper on Pensions (2007)). The other options 
can be divided into enhancing Social Welfare pensions on one hand and encouraging 
greater personal savings through supplementary pensions on the other hand. Reforming 
the state pension system implies making it more generous (through improving the 
adequacy of the system) and less means-tested (through extending coverage). This would 
require higher public spending on pensions, and thus higher contribution rates. Shifting 
away from the usual Anglo-Saxon type and implementing earnings-related pension 
benefits can also be considered. The choice experiment aims at evaluating these reform 
options from the citizens’ point of view. 
3  Modelling State Pension System Preferences 
How different variables affect people’s evaluation of the public pension system? Political 
economy literature on the determination of pension systems’ parameters models 
individuals’ preferences in an overlapping generation setting, where agents choose the 
values of the parameter(s) through maximizing their utility function over the life cycle. In 
line with this strand of the literature, we introduce a life-cycle model of pension 
preferences involving a number of choices:  
  the level of the contribution rate;  
  the size of the pension benefit;  
  how benefits are redistributed;  
  the eligibility age for the benefit; and  
  the resulting poverty rate among the elderly induced by the pension system 
chosen.  
We consider a two-periods overlapping generation model. Individuals are successively 
active (18-64 years) then retired (older than 65 years). In addition to age distinction, 
respondents also differ in revenue endowment. For simplicity we assume that the society 
consists of two groups of individuals. An individual of type i is characterized by his 
exogenous income level: i w ,     m m i ;  with   m for below the median income,   m for 
above the median income
5. Each individual enters working activity at time 0, retires at 
date 
o l  1 and lives until time 1. We note 
g
i C  the discounted lifetime income of the 
respondent of generation g ( o y g ,  ) and income group i (    m m i ; ). See Table 1 for 
a definition of the lifetime income of each group. 
The lifetime budget constraint of an old agent is given by: 
 










i c b l c c C           (1)  
The lifetime budget constraint of the young agents is given by: 
                                                 



























o l represents lifetime leisure, it represents the period spend in retirement,  is a discount 
factor,  is the contribution rate to the state pension scheme, it determines the generosity 
of the system. In order to concentrate on the redistributive feature of the pension system, 
we do not consider explicitly the possibility to redistribute income through another tax. 
o
i c is consumption during old age and 
y
i c is consumption during youth. 
o
i b is the level of 
the state pension benefit for an old individual i. 
Table 1 
Definition of the revenues of the different groups 
Pension benefit  Consumption 
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i C U . Individuals are assumed to be altruistic, that is, they derive utility not only from 
their own lifetime consumption and leisure but also from the consumption enjoyed by the 
elderly of the opposite income group, and from preferences regarding the poverty rate 
among the elderly. That is, a representative individual votes over the pension benefit they 
would receive from the state pension system, but also on what the current pensioners 
receive. Indeed, individuals are not purely selfish and they might dislike outcomes that 
induce high poverty among the elderly, they are poverty averse (or inter-generationally 
inequality averse). Poverty aversion has an impact on the “size” of the state pension 
scheme,  that is, on “how much is distributed”. Furthermore, they have distributional 
preferences over the public pension system (they might be intra-generationally inequality 
averse). Attitudes to inequality have impact on “how pensions are distributed”, that is, 
whether pension benefits are means-tested; universal or earnings-related (see Figure 2).  
The maximization problem of the old generation is given by: 






















c u c c Pov l b C U
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i
            , , , max   (3)  
Similarly, the maximization problem of the young generation is given by: 






















c u c c Pov l b C U
y
i
            , , , max
' '   (4)  
   m m k , ,  i k  . 
g
i   is the preference parameter associated with lifetime 
consumption. Povis the current poverty rate among the elderly. 
g
i  indicates the effect of Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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poverty aversion. Individual feel poverty aversion if  0 
g
i  . 
g
i  is the parameter 
preference for the level of the state pension benefit for the elderly of the other income 
group. ’ refers to the next period variable for the young and the former period variable for 
the old. 
Figure 2  
Degree of redistribution of the state pension system 
































Usually, income is allocated between consumption and saving through a maximisation 
process of the inter-temporal utility. However, neither data on consumption, nor on 
saving are available. Therefore, income, during the first period of life is used as a proxy 
for consumption. We suppose that actual income is equal to disposable income minus 
taxes (apart from contributions to pensions) and saving. We further assumed that only 
public pension benefits compose retirement income. This is a restrictive hypothesis as 
52.9% of respondents from the sample are members of a private scheme.  
The specification above (equations (3) and (4)) implies the estimation of four conditional 
logit models (see Section 6). The estimation process of the utility model allows testing 
empirically hypothesis built up from previous literature on demand for redistribution. The 
question behind the different hypothesis is: what are the forces behind people’s 
preferences for redistribution by the public pension system? The estimation of the life 
cycle model allows assessing the explanatory power of three different effects. The first 
hypothesis relates to the income effect, also presented as the “homo economicus effect” 
in Corneo and Grüner (2002). The first argument stipulates that Income is an important 
determinant in people’s evaluation of the public pension system as respondents are 
egoistic and will choose the pension alternative that increases their pecuniary gains. The 
second hypothesis relates to age. Following the assumption made by many political 
economy models in line with the seminal work of Browning (1975), the age effect 
suggests that the older the respondent, the more they will choose a higher contribution 
rate to the public pension system. Similarly, pensioners (who benefit the most from the 
state pension system) are the more in favour of maintaining the current system and 
against the “retrenchment” of the welfare state. Hamil-Luker (2001) analyzes the impact 
of age on public opinion toward government spending on old age assistance and finds 
that age doesn’t have a strong explanatory power. Finally, the value orientation effect 
suggests that respondents’ attitudes towards redistribution through the state pension 
system are determined by their degree of inequality aversion which stipulates that 
individuals are inequality averse, independently from their economic status (see Bowles 
and Gintes (2000)). This is justified by individuals’ altruistic preferences. Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Given the hypothesis just mentioned, we are interested in studying how changes in the 
relevant parameters of the model affect the utility of the different groups in society. Table 
2 and Table 3 present some comparative statics properties of the model. The aim is to 
examine how given utilities change in response to changes in parameters of the variables.  
Table 2  
Comparative statics of the attributes of the pension system on individual preferences  
Utility  Pov   m b    m b      o l  
 First  derivatives 
o
m U   - +  +  - + 
o
m U   - +  +  - + 
y
m U   - +  +  - + 
y
m U   - +  +  - + 
Table 3 






























































































































































































































4  Theoretical basis of Discrete Choice Experiments 
The demand for reforming the public Irish pension system is assessed through using and 
extending a particular stated preferences method: choice experiment; conducted to value 
individuals’ preferences regarding the parameters of the Irish public pension system, 
more precisely through estimating preferences for alternative pension systems (means-
tested, universal or earnings-related) as a function of the system attributes and 
individuals’ characteristics and attitudes.  
Discrete CEs have widely been used in the literature since their introduction in the 
marketing and transport fields by Louviere and Hensher (1982) and Louviere and 
Woodworth (1983). They have now been widely applied in many areas, such as the 
environmental economics literature (Blamey et al. (1999)), recreation (Hanley et al. 
(2002)), health (Hall et al. (2004)), transport economics and marketing (See Hensher 
(1994) and Louviere (1994) for an overview of the use of choice modeling in the field of 
transportation and marketing respectively). However, the use of stated preferences 
techniques in the field of pensions is still scarce. Discrete choice experiments are 
consistent with the Lancasterian microeconomic approach (Lancaster (1966)) whereby Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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individuals derive utility from the attributes of a good rather than the good itself. In 
choice experiments, each respondent is typically presented with several choice sets, each 
containing a set of alternative public goods - in our case alternative public pension 
systems - defined in terms of their attributes at specified levels. Each alternative being a 
different combination of the attributes and their levels constructed following a given 
experimental design Respondents are then asked to choose their most preferred 
alternative. They are assumed to choose the option that provides them with the highest 
utility value. A baseline alternative (or status quo) is usually included in each choice set. 
Typically, five to eight choice sets are included in a choice experiment. The choice 
experiment reported in this paper contains alternatives that describe hypothetical, 
constructed potential State pension systems in order to analyze people’s preferences for 
different kinds of public pension provisions, each implying a different degree of 
redistribution. The hypothetical scenarios were constructed in such a way to be as 
realistic as possible.  
CE finds its theoretical basis in the random utility model (Thurstone (1927); McFadden 
(1974)), which models choices as a function of attributes and their levels. According to 
the Random Utility Theory (RUT), the indirect utility function that an individual k 
allocates to one alternative i ( ki U ) is decomposed into two parts: a deterministic part ( ki V ) 
which is typically assumed to be linear and additive in the attributes (x) of the A different 
alternatives in the choice set, and a stochastic element ( ) which represents the 
unobservable influences on individual choice.  
The indirect utility function associated with alternative i  for an individual k can be 
written: 
 ki ki ki ki ki ki x x V U          (5)  
Where  represents the vector of preference parameters (coefficients) associated with the 
vector of attribute levels  i x  
The probability that respondent k prefers option i to any option j in the choice set can be 
expressed as the probability that the utility associated with alternative i  exceeds that 
associated with all other alternatives: 
          ki kj kj ki kj ki V V P j i U U P            (6)  
Assuming that the error terms are independently and identically distributed (IID) with an 
extreme-value (Weibull) distribution implies that the probability of any particular 
alternative i being chosen as the most preferred can be expressed in terms of the logistic 
distribution (McFadden (1973)). The following specification is known as a conditional 
logit model: 
 











   
 
(7)  
Where  is a scale parameter, inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the error 
distribution.   is commonly normalized to one (Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)). The 
independence of the Weibull error terms across the different options contained in the Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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choice set implies that specification (3) obeys the Independence from Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) property (or Luce’s Choice Axiom; see Luce (1959)) which states that 
the relative probabilities of two options being selected are unaffected by the introduction 
or removal of other alternatives. That is to say that the error terms are uncorrelated 
between choices and have the same variance (Carson et al. (1994)). Violations of the IIA 
assumption can be tested using a test developed by Hausman and McFadden (1984). If a 
violation of the IIA hypothesis is observed, then more complex statistical models, that 
relax some of the assumptions used, are necessary. Such models are the random 
parameters logit model (Train (1998)) or the nested logit model (McFadden (1978)). The 
latter allows for correlations among the error terms within classes of alternatives. The 
most common method for estimating the parameters of the model is the maximum 
likelihood. 
Welfare measures, and more specifically Willingness to Pay (WTP) compensating 



























0 V is the utility of the initial state and 
1 V the utility of the alternative state. 
y  represents the marginal utility of income and is the coefficient of the cost attribute. 
The value of a marginal change in any of the attributes can be expressed as the ratio of 
coefficients given in the estimation of (7), where  c  is the coefficient on any of the 








In order to apply the RUT to our study framework, different attributes have been selected 




Table 4  
Definition of the choice specific attributes 
Attributes Description
lo_pen Weekly State Pension for a low income individual
hi_pen Weekly State Pension for a high income individual
cost Weekly contribution to finance State pensions for the average wage 
pov Poverty rate among the elderly
ret_age Minimum retirement age (years)
The baseline empirical specification is given by the indirect utility (10). Several variants 
will be presented in section 6. 
i i i i ki age ret pov t pen hi pen lo V _ cos _ _ 5 4 3 2 1             (10)   
5  Survey Instrument Design and Sample Characteristics 
5.1  Questionnaire and sampling design 
The survey instrument has been developed following several rounds of testing, involving 
one pilot test, individual interviews, discussions with PhD students and one focus group 
composed of participants from the general public. The resulting questionnaire is 
structured in three parts: Part I: Attitudinal questionnaire; Part II: Choice Experiment; 
and, Part III: Socio-economic questionnaire. The choice experiment aims at investigating 
attitudes towards the current Irish state-run pension system and towards some of the 
likely reforms resulting from the modification of the parameters of the system and 
involving changes in its principles, degree of redistribution, type of redistribution and 
poverty among the elderly. As shown in Table 5, five attributes have been selected for 
valuation. The first attribute is the weekly state pension benefit for a working individual 
at two third the average earning (low income worker). The second attribute is the weekly 
state pension benefit for a working individual at three times the average earning (high 
income worker). The weekly state pension for a low income individual takes on five 
different levels, among which the first corresponds to the actual state benefit. The levels 
of the weekly state benefit for a high income individual vary accordingly to describe 
either a means-tested, a universal or an earnings-related system. The third attribute is the 
cost one and corresponds to the weekly contribution amount required to finance state 
pension benefits for an average individual worker. The fourth attribute is the poverty rate 
among the elderly implied by each alternative system. Finally, the fifth attribute is the 
earliest retirement age at which individuals are allowed to receive their State pension, 
which takes on two values, either the current retirement age: 65 years or a higher 
retirement age: 68 years. The attributes have been combined in eight choice sets, 
comprising all the alternatives allowed by the design (32 alternatives). Each choice set 
comprises four alternative choices. A baseline alternative corresponding to the current 





Description of the attributes and levels 
Attributes
Current situation
Weekly State Pension for 
a low income individual
≤210 210 220 260 180
 Weekly State Pension 
for a high income 
individual
≤210 210, 0, 500 220, 0, 520 260, 0, 620 180, 0, 430
Weekly contribution to 
finance State pensions for 
the average wage 
€30-35 €35-40 €40-45 €45-50 €30-35
€15-20 €15-20 €20-25 €10-15
€50-55  €55-60 €65-70 €45-50
Poverty rate among the 
elderly
Medium (10%-15%) Low (5%-10%) Very low (<5%) Very low (<5%) Medium (10%-15%)
High (15%-20%)  Medium (10%-15%) Very high (20%-25%)
Minimum retirement 
age (years)
65, 68 65, 68 65, 68 65, 68 65, 68
Levels
 
The Sampling strategy was designed so as to obtain a representative sample of the Irish 
population. The questionnaires were administered using door-to-door technique. In most 
of the cases, and in accordance with respondents’ wishes, the questionnaires were 
dropped off and collected according to an arranged time. The sampling approach for the 
survey followed a two-stage procedure. Sampling was first stratified according to the two 
principle Irish areas classification: Urban/Rural. The second stage involved the choice of 
locations that are representative of the Irish population in terms of age, gender and socio-
economic status. The survey was administered to a representative sample of 498 
respondents drawn from the adult Irish population entitled to vote (persons aged 18 years 
and over). At the end, 326 questionnaires were ready to analyze. The overall response 
rate of the survey was 65 percent. Table 6 shows the sample age ranges proportions as 





Proportions of the different age ranges in the total population (sample and national 
proportions) 
Area 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 70 or more Total
Urban
Number of respondents 54 31 36 32 28 19 200
Percentage in the total sample of the same age 
range 78.26 62.00 48.65       58.18 60.87 59.38 61.35 
Rural
Number of respondents 15 19 38 23 18 13 126
Percentage in the total sample of the same age 
range 21.74 38.00 51.35      41.82 39.13 40.63 38.65 
Total
Number of respondents 69 50 74 55 46 32 326
Percentage in the total population sample 21.17 15.34 22.7 16.87 14.11 9.82 100
National proportions in the population aged 
15 years and over (%)  18.75 21.40 26.61 14.00 9.63 9.61 100
National proportions in the total population 
(%) 14.92 17.04 21.18 11.14 7.67 7.65 100
age range
Note: National proportions for the age group 18 to 24 years corespond to the proportions of the age group 15-24.
 
5.2  Descriptive statistics for the sample 
5.2.1  Profile and main characteristics of the survey respondents 
Age is an important variable within the framework of this analysis as pension policy is 
mainly a “generational” issue. The age distribution of the survey reflects that of the 
gender population, with around 23% in the 35-49 years age range, which is the largest 
percentage of any of the age groups. The majority of respondents are male: 52% against 
and a majority, (47%) attained at least a recognized third level education level. Among 
respondents, 51% are married. 24% of the individuals live in a household composed of 2 
persons, whilst 21% live in a household composed of 4 persons. A majority (27 %) of 
respondents are private sector employees, while 17% are retired. For 63%, the main 
household income source is employment, which is the largest proportion of all sources of 
income, 11% of respondents belong to a household that relies mainly on public pensions 
for its income and 8% on social welfare. 22% have or have had elderly relatives living in 
their households.  
We expect that pensioners, individuals belonging to a household that derives a large share 
of his income from public pensions, and individuals who have had elderly relatives living 
in their households are more likely to oppose retrenchment of public pensions than those 
who are less dependent on welfare state programs
6. This hypothesis comes from 
Pierson’s “new politics of the welfare state” which posits that social transfer programs 
generate self-interested beneficiary groups who will act politically to defend their 
“programs”. This is particularly true for the retirees as they almost completely rely on 
                                                 
6 Lynch (2006) tests this hypothesis.  Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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pensions. Income should have a strong explanatory power in explaining individuals’ 
choices (In accordance with the Meltzer and Richard model). A majority (28.5%) belong 
to a household earning between €20000 and €40000 a year before taxes and 22% to a 
household earning between €40000 and €60000 a year.  
5.2.2  Attitudinal profile of the survey sample 
People’s knowledge about the functioning of the pension system seems to be an age issue 
implying that the older the respondent, the more they are informed about how the pension 
system operates and about the level of the pension benefit it provides. While in general, 
very few people are very well informed (17%),  the majority of retirees (+50%) is very 
well informed. This result is also available for people’s knowledge about their (likely) 
retirement income. We expect better informed voters to be more likely to favour reforms 
(See Boeri et al. (2001)).  
41% of respondents are in favour of a higher pension benefit for the poor (equivalent to a 
means-tested system) and 37% are in favour of the same pension benefit for everyone 
(universal system). Only 20% of individuals are in favour of earnings-related pension 
system. Among these, 51% are respondents who belong to the highest income band, this 
same income group is the least in favour of the other systems proposed.  
Respondents were further presented with three options to deal with demographic ageing. 
The solution that seems to be the most popular is increasing the retirement age followed 
by saving more for retirement. The solution that is the least popular is that the 
government spends more on pensions. Respondents were also asked how they agree with 
three pension principles. The majority of respondents (36%) strongly disagree with the 
principle that it is an individual responsibility to save for old age. 47% of respondents 
strongly agree with the fact that it is the government responsibility to provide each 
pensioner with a pension benefit. Finally, 41% of respondents slightly agree that the way 
the pension benefit is provided in Ireland should remain the same, and 31% of 
respondents strongly disagree with this statement. The general idea from this question is 
that the status quo (maintaining the current state pension system) is not the preferred 
option; still a great majority of individuals thinks it is the government responsibility to 
provide each pensioner with a state pension benefit. Concerning the way to pay for the 
pension benefit, a large majority of respondents (66%) choose the option: the richer pay 
proportionally more than the poorer, which suggests that respondents opt for a 




Table 7  
Attitudinal Profile of the Respondents 
Frequency Percent
Differences in income in Ireland are too large…
strongly agree 135 41.41
slightly agree 108 33.13
strongly disagree 13 3.99
slightly disagree 27 8.28
neither agree nor disagree 21 6.44
Overall, would you be in favour of…
less inequality and more tax 130 39.88
more inequality and less tax 44 13.50
An unchanged amount of taxes and same level of inequality
62 19.02
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the
differences in income…
strongly agree 118 36.20
slightly agree 97 29.75
strongly disagree 42 12.88
slightly disagree 29 8.90
neither agree nor disagree 18 5.52  
Besides specific questions on pensions, we also surveyed general attitudes towards the 
welfare state and demand for redistribution. Concerning income inequality in Ireland, a 
majority (more than 41%) of respondents strongly agree with the statement “differences 
in income in Ireland are too large” (Table 7). A clear majority (39.5%) are in favour of 
less inequality and more tax. A higher proportion of individuals also strongly agree with 
the fact that it is a governmental responsibility to reduce income inequality. 
6  Estimated models and Results  
In this section, we report the conditional logit models used to estimate the Random 
Utility Model (RUM) constructed to assess preferences for alternative state pension 
systems. The selected choice specific attributes are used to specify the utility of each 
pension alternative. The models presented below were estimated with STATA using 
Maximum Likelihood estimation procedures. Several Conditional logit (CL) models have 
been estimated. The first set of models includes only choice specific attributes and the 
second set adds individual specific characteristics.  
6.1  Definition of the Baseline Specifications 
We begin by showing four specifications. The four different variants seem satisfactory 
both on the economic and statistical side. Obviously, the poverty rate among the elderly 
has a strong effect on people’s evaluation of the public pension system.  
In a first attempt, not reported in the table below, we run a Conditional Logit model, with 
only regressors the attributes of choices (see equation (10) above). Results show that the 
estimate of the cost attribute is positive and the estimates of the attributes “level of the Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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pension benefit for a low income individual” (henceforth low pension) and “level of the 
pension benefit for a high income individual” (henceforth high pension) are negative. We 
then estimate a non linear utility function by introducing the square values of cost, 
poverty, low pension and high pension.  
The utility function retained is defined as follows: 
i
i i i i i i ki
age ret pov pov
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Model 1 (CL1) in Table 8 represents the above basic non linear specification. All the 
coefficients are different from zero at the 1 percent significance level with the exception 
of the square value of poverty and of the attribute retirement age. The signs of the 
attributes are as expected. A higher level of the low pension increased the probability that 
a pension scheme alternative would be chosen, as did the high pension but at a much 
lower magnitude. Greater poverty and higher cost reduced the choice probability of 
choosing the associated state pension scheme. A retirement age above the existing one 
also decreased the probability of the option being chosen. This last effect is however not 
significant. 
6.1.1  Introducing alternative specific constants 
In a second model (CL2), we introduce Alternative Specific Constants (ASC’s). The 
number of the ASCs depends on the number of alternatives in a choice set. As we have 
four alternatives in each choice set, the first alternative being the status-quo, we estimate 
a set of three ASCs. The ASCs show the effect of asymmetric but unobserved factors of 
respondents’ choices (Morrison et al. (2002)). ASCs explain why respondents chose a 
different pension system apart from changes in the attributes that were presented to them 
in the choice experiment.  
The indirect utility associated with choosing alternative i is given by: 
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The parameters associated with the ASCs are positive and significant at the 1 percent 
significance level. Similarly, all variables (apart from the retirement age) are significant 
and of the expected signs. 
A utility function considering the alternative of choosing the status quo has been 
estimated (CL3). A new variable, Alternative0, has been created: 
0 _
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The Alternative Specific Constant is specified to equal 0 when Alternative A, B or C was 
selected and to 1 when the “status quo” option was chosen. The alternative specific to the 
status quo is negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level, meaning that 
choosing the current pension scheme decreases utility. 
6.1.2  Introducing pension system type Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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Three variables have been created to account for individuals’ choices regarding different 
kinds of financing state pensions implying different kinds of redistribution: means-tested, 
universal and earnings-related. The model that has been estimated is given by the 
following indirect utility function (CL4):  
related earnings universal tested means
age ret pov t pen hi pen lo V i i i i ki
_ _
_ cos _ _
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1
  
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  
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  (14)
Table 8  
Random utility pension choice: Models 1-4 
Actual Choice CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4
State pension benefit  0.136 0.148 0.165 0.013
for a low income individual (6.38)** (4.97)** (7.25)** (3.12)**
Low pension-squared -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0003
(-6.08)** (-4.37)** (-6.63)**
State pension benefit  0.012 0.037 0.037 0.003
for a high income individual (5.71)** (5.87)** (5.88)** (1.11)
High-pension-squared -0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00003
 (-7.27)** (-7.07)** (-7.08)**
Poverty rate among the elderly -11.078  -17.486 -16.775 -4.254
(-3.88)** (-4.79)** (-5.36)** (-3.28)**
poverty-squared 6.834 8.020 7.535
(0.61) (0.64) (0.67)
Cost for an average  -0.149 -0.459 -0.452 -0.039
worker  (-4.32)** (-5.76)** (-5.67)** (-1.14)
Cost-squared 0.0013 0.002 0.002
(3.60)** (5.70)** (5.59)**
Retirement age -0.016 -0.020 -0.022 -0.041








 (current situation) (-4.18)**
Means-tested pension alternative -0.605
(-1.77)
Universal pension alternative 0.292
(1.44)
Earnings-related pension alternative -1.219
(-2.84)**
log likelihood -3022.21 -3012.12 -3013.40 -3048.10
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Following CL4, a universal pension scheme increases utility whereas a means-tested or 
an earnings-related pension scheme reduces the probability of the alternative to be 
selected. However choosing a universal pension scheme is not significant. Also, 
introducing these variables reduces the significance of the model as the high pension and 
cost are not significant.  
All four models predict the expected effects of the pension attributes on the utility of 
respondents. The levels of the pension benefits (low and high) increase utility associated 
with the alternative. Cost, retirement age and poverty decrease the probability of the 
alternative to be chosen. However, what is striking is the strength of the poverty rate in 
reducing utility. This suggests that individuals are highly poverty averse and are in favour 
of a system that leads to the lowest poverty rate among the elderly.  
6.2  Accounting for respondents’ heterogeneity in the choice modelling 
In a further step, we propose four groups of models that allow for taking into account 
respondents’ heterogeneity by introducing differences between individuals into the model 
(Mazzanti (2003)). Specifically, we estimated the impact of age, income, social 
preferences and value orientation on the assessment of the Irish state pension system.  
There may be several reasons why people surveyed would have a strong preference for 
maintaining the current public pension scheme or reform it to either a means–tested, 
universal or earnings-related system. The first and most advanced reason, as mentioned 
by the theoretical literature, refers to one’s own pecuniary benefits. Assuming that people 
are rational utility maximizing, they should have the strongest preferences for the system 
that provides them with the highest financial benefit. In this respect, income should have 
important explanatory power. However, pecuniary self-interest has been challenged in the 
empirical literature as not being the main determinant of people’s preferences and 
attitudes. Other forces might increase individuals’ utility and thus imply higher demand 
for redistribution. In this respect, several models have been worked out to include other-
regarding motives. For instance, Tabellini (2000) includes altruism from the children to 
their parents to describe social security systems. Age and the degree to which individuals 
benefit from public pensions are also expected to explain differences in preferences. 
Finally, inequality aversion and value orientations may be important explanatory 
variables. Van der Heijden et al. (1997) test empirically if altruism and fairness intervene 
in people’s evaluation of public pensions and find strong support that both effects affect 
individuals’ utility.  
6.2.1  Testing for Pecuniary Self-Interest 
In order to test for heterogeneity in preferences according to income, two separate 
conditional logit models are run for two separate groups: those reporting an annual 
individual income above the median annual income of the sample and those reporting an 
annual individual income below the median annual income. Results are given in Table 9. 
The first income group (column 1) contains 157 individuals whereas the second income 
group (column 2) contains 169 individuals. The third column shows the results of 
interactions between individual income and different types of pension provision.  
As in all preceding models, poverty aversion plays a key role in the valuation of the 
public pension system. As it is expected, a higher poverty rate among the elderly reduces Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
21 
 
utility of the low-income individuals much more than the utility of the high income 
individuals, its coefficient is however not significant for the high income group. It is 
negative and significant at the 1% level for the low income group. A higher low pension 
benefit increases both the utility of the high income and of the low income group. The 
coefficients are positive and significant in the two cases; however, the estimated 
coefficient is higher for the low income group. The estimated coefficients for the high 
pension benefit are also positive and significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient 
is slightly higher for the high income group suggesting that the high pension benefit 
increases utility of the high income group more than of the low income group. These two 
effects give strong support to the self pecuniary argument. The estimated coefficients of 
the cost attribute in both income group models are of the expected sign and significant at 
the 5% level, however a higher contribution rate seems to decrease the utility of the high 
income group more than the utility of the low income group, which is a non expected 
result. This could be explained by the fact that the richest are not willing to pay more to 
have a higher pension benefit and probably count more on private pensions as suggested 
by the summary statistics of the attitudinal questionnaire.  
The third column shows that an earnings-related pension system increases individuals’ 
utility as their income increases. Indeed, the interaction between individual income and 
the earnings-related pension scheme alternative is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level. This is a further support for the income effect. Introducing a universal or a means-
tested pension scheme impacts utility in the opposite direction: both interactions are 
negative, with the interaction with the means-tested system being significant at the 1 




Table 9  
Random utility pension choice by income group 
Variable Above median income Below median income Interaction with individual income
State pension benefit  0.132 0.141 0.135
for a low income individual (4.46)** (4.55)** (6.15)**
Low pension-squared -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-4.21)** (-4.38)** (-5.93)**
State pension benefit  0.013 0.011 0.009
for a high income individual (4.52)** (3.56)** (3.41)**
High-pension-squared -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
(-5.69)** (-4.59)** (-5.64)**
Poverty rate among the elderly -7.543 -15.448 -11.058
(-1.94) (-3.65)** (-3.77)**
poverty-squared -5.585 22.304 7.807
(-0.36) (1.34) (0.68)
Cost for an average  -0.162 -0.136 -0.134
worker (-3.44)* (-2.67)* (-3.38)**
Cost-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.98)* (2.08)* (3.49)**
Retirement age -0.042 0.012 -0.015
(-1.78) (0.48) (-0.88)
Individual income*earnings 0.00001
 related pension system (2.73)**
Individual income*means-tested  -0.00002
pension system (-4.15)**
Individual income*universal  -0.000003
pension system (-1.02)
Log likelihood -1613.24 -1397.56 = -2870.3158
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  
6.2.2  Testing for Age Heterogeneity 
Separate conditional logit models have been run for two generations: the young 
generation (younger than 65 years) and the old generation (over 65 years). For each 
generation, two models have been run. The first model is the baseline model and the 
second one includes a variable describing the current pension scheme. Results are 
reported in Table 10. Almost all pension attributes are statistically significant at the 1% 
level for all four models. The variable indicating the retirement age was found to be 
statistically insignificant in all models; indeed the attribute retirement age doesn’t seem to 




Table 10  
Random Utility Pension Choice by Generation 
Variable
State pension benefit  0.179 0.181 0.129 0.162
for a low income individual (3.16)** (3.03)** (5.58)** (6.57)**
Low pension-squared ‐0.0003 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0003
(‐3.06)** (‐3.01)** (‐5.29)** (‐5.88)**
State pension benefit  0.022 0.023 0.010 0.041
for a high income individual (3.95)** (1.54) (4.44)** (5.78)**
High-pension-squared ‐0.00002 ‐0.00002 ‐0.00001 ‐0.00004
(‐4.13)** (‐2.13)* (‐6.08)** (‐6.84)**
Poverty rate among the elderly ‐17.181 ‐17.566 ‐9.859 ‐16.755
(‐2.34)* (‐2.20)* (‐3.17)** (‐4.91)**
poverty-squared 17.293 17.226 4.668 5.980
(0.60) (0.59) (0.38) (0.49)
Cost for an average  ‐0.295 ‐0.316 ‐0.119 ‐0.484
worker (‐3.34)** (‐1.65) (‐3.18)** (‐5.51)**
Cost-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(2.32)* (1.88) (2.84)** (5.33)**
Retirement age ‐0.008 ‐0.009 ‐0.017 ‐0.025
(‐0.20) (‐0.21) (‐0.93) (‐1.34)
Current pension system ‐0.065 ‐1.091
(‐0.12) (‐4.54)**
Log likelihood ‐480.31  ‐480.31  ‐2533.87 ‐2523.46
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%
Older than 65 years Younger than 65 years
 
When including the status quo alternative in the estimation, the variables “low pension” 
and “cost” become insignificant for the old group, these variables remain however highly 
significant and of the expected sign for the young group. In all cases, a higher low 
pension benefit increases the probability of the alternative to be chosen. In fact, estimated 
coefficients for the low pension are significant at the 1% level for both generations and 
higher for the old generation. the older the respondent, the more they are in favour of an 
expansion of the state pension system. Poverty rate among the elderly is negative and 
significant at the 5% level for the old generation and at the 1% level for the young 
generation. When not including the current pension system in the utility function, a 
higher poverty rate decreases the probability of the alternative being chosen at a much 
higher degree for the old generation than for the young generation. Similarly, in the 
baseline model, cost decreases the utility of the old generation more than the utility of the 
young generation. This result is however inversed once we include the “current situation” 
variable, furthermore the estimated coefficient of the cost attribute is no longer 
significant for the old generation. This latter result is in contradiction with the theoretical 
priors as we would have expected retirees to be in favour of a higher contribution rate as 
they don’t contribute to the system anymore and are net beneficiaries. Finally, the 
estimated coefficient for the variable “current system” is negative but not significant for 
the old generation. It is negative and significant at the 1% level for the young generation 
suggesting that the younger prefer departing from the current state pension scheme. Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Maintaining the current pension system decreases the utility of the old generation less 
than the utility of the young generation. However, from theoretical findings, we would 
expect the current pension system alternative to have a positive effect on the utility of the 
pensioners and they gain from this system.  
6.2.3  Testing for Age and Income Heterogeneity in Evaluating the Public Pension 
System 
Table 11 reports the estimation results for four separate groups: old and low income, old 
and high income, young and low income and young and high income agents. 
The estimated coefficients for the high income-old generation are all of the expected sign, 
but only three variables: the high pension benefit, its squared value and the cost are 
significant at the 1% level. Poverty rate is significant at the 5% level. The estimated 
coefficients for the low income-old generation are also all of the expected sign, apart 
from the retirement age which is positive. The low pension benefit and its squared value 
are significant at the 1% level. The high pension benefit and its squared value are 
significant at the 5% level. All the other estimates are not significant. The estimated 
coefficients for the high income-young generation are of the expected sign. However 
poverty rate, its squared value and the retirement age are not significant. Finally, the 
estimated coefficients for the low income-young generation are all of the expected sign 
apart from the retirement age which is positive. All the variables are significant apart 
from the squared value of poverty, the squared value of cost and the retirement age.  
The estimated coefficient of the low pension benefit is the lowest for the low income-
young generation which is surprising as we expect it to be the lowest for the high income-
young generation. However, it is the highest for the low income-old generation, which is 
as expected. The estimated coefficient for the high pension benefit is also the lowest for 
the low-income-young group. Poverty aversion is the highest among the high income-old 
generation, followed by the low income-young generation, suggesting that poverty 
aversion is still a crucial element in the evaluation of the pension system. Poverty 
aversion is thus independent from age and income. Cost aversion is also the highest 
among the high income-old generation. This is also not expected. Indeed, the older 
should be the more in favour of increasing contribution rates to the public pension system 
as they are not any more in the tax system; similarly, we expect a higher contribution to 
decrease the utility of the low income individuals more than the utility of the high income 




Table 11  
Estimation Results for Four Groups Differentiated by Age and Income 
Variable over 65 years & over 65 years & Below 65 years & Below 65 years &
above median income below median income above median income below median income
State pension benefit for  0.138 0.242 0.132 0.126
a low income individual (1.85) (2.73)** (4.07)** (3.80)**
Low pension-squared -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-1.80) (-2.62)** (-3.79)** (-3.67)**
State pension benefit for 0.023 0.019 0.011 0.010
a high income individual (3.14)** (2.20)* (3.44)** (2.84)**
High-pension-squared -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001
(-3.05)** (-2.45)* (-4.67)** (-3.86)**
Poverty rate among  -22.741 -6.006 -4.098 -16.667
the elderly (-2.32)* (-0.51) (-0.95) (-3.65)**
poverty-squared 36.524 -27.450 -16.023 28.869
(0.97) (-0.55) (-0.94) (1.62)
Cost for an average  -0.322 -0.221 -0.118 -0.118
worker (-2.80)** (-1.54) (-2.25)* (-2.15)*
Cost-squared 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.83) (1.05) (2.12)* (1.75)
Retirement age -0.051 0.043 -0.040 0.006
(-0.87) (0.66) (-1.55) (0.26)
log likelihood -262.91 -212.40 -1340.08  -1180.32
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  
6.2.4  Testing for value orientation 
Apart from the two most commonly advanced reasons (age and income) to explain 
people’s heterogeneity in evaluating pensions, people’s utility may be affected differently 
because of value judgments about equality and social justice in general and regarding the 
objectives and principles of a pension system in particular.  
Table 12 reports regression results introducing interactions between attitudinal 
characteristics of the respondents and choice specific attributes for the whole sample. The 
estimate coefficients for the choice specific attributes are all significant at the 1 percent 
level and of the expected sign. Almost all interactions are of the expected sign. 
Interactions displaying significant parameters at the 1 percent level suggest that people’s 
attitudes regarding the role of the state in the income redistribution and their opinion 
about the principles of the pension system are important determinants in their evaluation 




Table 12  




State pension benefit for a  0.399 More inequality and less tax*cost -0.038
low income individual (8.17)** (-2.06)*
Low pension-squared -0.001 Less inequality and more tax 0.615
(-7.30)** *poverty rate (0.32)
State pension benefit for a  0.021 Income difference in Ireland  0.0001
high income individual (1.78) are too large*low pension (0.06)
High-pension-squared -0.00006 Everyone pays proportionally  -0.008
(-5.09)** the same*low pension (-2.10)*
Poverty rate among the elderly -485.977 Everyone pays proportionally  0.001
(-8.22)** the same*high pension (4.02)**
poverty-squared 506.097 Everyone pays proportionally  1.573
(6.74)** the same*poverty rate (0.86)
Cost for an average worker -3.942 The poor receive a higher 0.017
(-6.03)** pension benefit*low pension (6.05)**
Cost-squared 0.008 The poor receive a higher  -0.001
(3.62)** pension benefit*high pension (-4.64)**
Retirement age -0.216 Pensionproportional to   earnings 0.0004
(-3.71)**  before retirement*high pension (0.93)
Benefit for a high income  -0.481 Everyone has the same  -8.178
individual*poverty (-6.57)** pension benefit*poverty rate (-6.64)**
Poverty rate among the  10.905 State responsability to reduce  0.009
elderly*cost (6.47)** inequality*high pension (7.17)**
Benefit for a low income 0.011 State responsability to reduce -0.117
 individual*cost (5.83)**  inequality*cost (-7.41)**
Poverty rate*retirement age 1.276 Individual responsibility to save 0.001
(2.65)** for its old age*high pension (2.95)**
Benfit for a high income  0.0004 State responsibility to provide pensioners 0.014
individual*retirement age (3.21)**  with a pension benefit*low pension (4.80)**
People will have to work longer 0.015
*retirement age (0.39)
The state will have to spend  0.0008
more on pensions*low pension (0.22)
The state will have to spend  0.005
more on pensions*high pension (2.40)*
People will have to work  -0.014
longer*cost (-2.91)**
The state will have to spend -0.072
 more on pensions*cost (-2.26)*
The state will have to spend  -2.204
more on pensions*poverty rate (-0.76)
Less inequality and more tax 0.001
*low pension (0.47)
More inequality and less tax 0.005
*high pension (3.40)**
Less inequality and  0.016
more tax*cost (2.73)** Log likelihood  -1887.24
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%
Total sample
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This paper has analyzed the different forces that can affect people’s evaluation of the 
state pension system. Data used to estimate individuals’ well-being come from a choice 
experiment conducted in Ireland in 2008. Respondents were presented with several 
choice sets, each containing four alternatives from which they had to choose one. Each 
alternative has different implications for the extent of intra-generational and inter-
generational redistribution. In general, within the political economy literature about 
demand for redistribution though social security, it is assumed that individuals’ utility is 
determined by their self-interest. In this respect, individuals’ own characteristics as 
income and age play a significant role. Nevertheless, other forces, as altruism and social 
preferences, may also explain people’s demand for redistribution. In this respect, 
estimation results have shown that poverty and inequality aversion indeed affect 
individuals’ utility and their demand for redistribution. All individuals, regardless of age 
and income are poverty averse and a higher poverty among the elderly decreases utility at 
an important degree. When the evaluation of the levels of pension benefits depends on 
age and income of respondents, cost and poverty are independent.  
Results induced by interactions between individual-specific characteristics and choice-
specific attributes confirm how people’s demand for redistribution through the state 
pension scheme is also driven by their perception of inequality, poverty, redistribution 
and their value orientation concerning pensions. Several other models not reported have 
also been estimated to test for heterogeneity in preferences. Notably, interacting political 
variables with the choice specific attributes has shown that the level of social contract as 
well as party partisanship partly explains individuals’ heterogeneity in their preferences 
for different kinds of state pension systems.  
One next objective of the study is to derive implicit prices for the pension-specific 
selected attributes and to investigate individuals’ preferences heterogeneity in 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for pension reforms. Individual preferences will be aggregated 
through a majority voting mechanism that handles multidimensional policy issue space 
(probabilistic voting model) in order to determine pension policy that will be 
implemented at the national level. Finally, it will be interesting to use the aggregated data 
from the choice experiment within a micro-simulation framework to account for the 
impact population ageing on the shape of the public pension system. Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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8  Appendix 
Appendix 1 : Example of a choice set 
Policy option 









1. Weekly State Pension for a low income 
individual 
≤ €210  €210  €180  €220 
2. Weekly State Pension for a high income 
individual  
≤ €210  €210  €180  €0 
3. Weekly contribution to finance State pensions 
for the average wage  
€30 - €35  €35 - €40  €30 - €35  €15 - €20 












5. Minimum retirement age   65 65 65 68 
Please Tick your preferred option             
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